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Abstract
Six- to 7-year-olds (N = 130) participated in classroom activities four times. The children were
interviewed about the final occurrence (target event) either a week or a month later, during which
half of the event items were inaccurately described. Half of these suggestions were consistent
with the theme of the detail across the occurrences (e.g., always sat on a kind of floor mat) or
were inconsistent (e.g., sat on a chair). When memory for the target event was tested a day later,
children falsely recognized fewer inconsistent than consistent suggestions, especially compared
to a control group of children who experienced the event just one time. Further, the longer delay
reduced accuracy only for consistent suggestions. Source-monitoring ability was strongly and
positively related to resistance to suggestions, and encouraging children to identify the source of
false suggestions allowed them to retract a significant proportion of their reports of inconsistent,
but not consistent, suggestions. The results suggest that the gist consistency of suggestions
determines whether event repetition increases or decreases suggestibility.

Keywords: eyewitness memory, suggestibility, repeated events, source monitoring, schema
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The consistency of false suggestions moderates children’s reports of a single instance of a
repeated event: Predicting increases and decreases in suggestibility
After decades of careful research, there is now a broad knowledge base on the
capabilities and vulnerabilities of child witnesses (see Gordon, Baker-Ward, & Ornstein, 2001,
for a review). Because a sizeable proportion of child witnesses allege multiple crimes, it is
unfortunate that most of the research has studied children’s eyewitness memories for isolated
events. Children’s memories of repeated events are quantitatively and qualitatively different to
memories of events experienced just one time (Fivush, 1984; Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992;
Kuebli & Fivush, 1994; Powell & Thomson, 1996; see review by Hudson, Fivush & Kuebli,
1992). Repeated experience, for example, can wipe out age differences in suggestibility (Powell,
Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). Hence, there is a major omission in our knowledge of the
processes affecting children’s testimony and scientists are limited in their ability to provide the
legal profession with empirically-based conclusions about children’s memories of repeated
experiences.
An especially important issue is children’s suggestibility after repeated experiences.
Compared to reports from children who have experienced an event one time, event repetition
makes children highly resistant to suggestions about details that were identical in each
occurrence of the event (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999). It is not yet clear,
however, how event repetition affects reactions to suggestions about details that vary each time
(e.g., a child abuse victim could be abused at different times and in different places). Repetition
of items that vary in each occurrence has been shown to increase suggestibility (Connolly &
Lindsay, 2001, Powell & Roberts, 2002), to decrease suggestibility (Powell, Roberts, &
Thomson, 2000), and to have no discernible effect on suggestibility (Powell & Roberts, 2002;

Why does repeated experience

4

Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). Thus far, researchers have identified post-event
factors that determine the direction of event-repetition effects on suggestibility. Event repetition
is more likely to increase children’s suggestibility when, for example, the suggestions are
explicitly linked to the occurrence that is later the target of the memory test, rather than linked
generally to the series of events (Powell et al., 2000). It is probable, however, that qualities of the
event representation itself impact suggestibility, and so we investigated whether the consistency
of suggestions to the gist of experienced details affected levels of suggestibility. Specifically, we
tested the hypothesis that children would be more suggestible when the suggestions were
consistent with the gist of experienced details than when they were gist-inconsistent, and that this
effect would be stronger in children with prior experience of the event than those with no prior
experience.
A second aim of the investigation was to determine the relation between sourcemonitoring skills and suggestibility after repeated experiences. Specifically, we tested whether
source-monitoring instructions enabled children to retract their false reports, and expected that
such instructions would be more successful in retracting reports of gist-inconsistent than gistconsistent suggestions. We begin by discussing memory representations of repeated experiences.
The consistency effect
Children can have remarkably good memories of routine events (see Davidson, 1996;
Roberts & Powell, 2001). Like adults, children have the capacity to store large amounts of
knowledge in schemata, or knowledge structures that contain typical elements of a given entity,
such as people, objects, places, and events (Fivush, 1984; Nelson, 1986; Schank & Abelson,
1977). In adults, recognition memory for details that are atypical or inconsistent with a script are
recognized more than details that are typical or consistent with a script, known as the typicality
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or consistency effect (e.g., Erdfelder & Bredenkamp, 1998; Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey,
1998; Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001; Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, &
Toglia, 2002; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989).
Although there is a reliable body of knowledge on the consistency effect in adults’
memories, the consistency effect has only been documented in children’s memories on just a few
occasions (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Models of script
development in children such as the script-confirmation-deployment model (Farrar & Goodman,
1992) suggest that, once a script has been established (i.e., the ‘script-deployment phase’),
atypical details are episodically encoded whereas there is no need to store such detailed
information about typical details because these are already represented in the script. Recognition
cues provide an exact match to the episodic trace thus rendering more accurate recognition of
atypical than typical details. Thus, one can speculate that children may remember atypical details
and thus reject false suggestions about them, but be less likely to remember the exact details of
items that were typical of a script, and consequently be misled by false suggestions about typical
details.
The consistency effect and suggestibility
Predictions about how the consistency effect may impact children’s suggestibility can
also be made from fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). According to fuzzy-trace
theory, event memories are dually represented as both verbatim details that comprise the exact
surface form of details (e.g., sat in the seat next to the bathroom) and gist representations
containing the general sense of what happened (e.g., ate at McDonald’s). False memories occur
in one of two ways (see Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002). First, a verbatim representation from
a different event may be retrieved (e.g., recall that sat next to the window); second, gist traces
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may be retrieved that lead to a feeling of familiarity when gist-consistent, but false, details are
presented (e.g., ate at Burger King). False memories of the first kind have been amply
demonstrated in studies of repeated-event memories (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson,
1990; Powell & Roberts, 2002; Powell et al., 1999). False memories of the second kind are of
interest in the current study. According to fuzzy-trace theory, false-but-gist-consistent memory
errors should be most likely when the gist representation is strong. Because gist representations
may be strengthened by the repetition of similar events, fuzzy-trace theory predicts that children
will be more resistant to gist-inconsistent suggestions than gist-consistent suggestions after
repeated experiences.
In a recent study, 7-year-olds participated twice or four times in a standard event
(interacting with a wizard) and then participated once in a similar event that deviated from the
standard event (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999) Some deviations were typical or scriptconsistent (e.g., finger painting) and the rest were atypical or script-inconsistent (e.g., having a
snack). The 7-year-olds recalled more of the script-inconsistent deviations than the scriptconsistent deviations. These results replicate Davidson’s and Hoe’s (1993) study demonstrating
the consistency effect in children’s story recall. Additionally, Farrar and Boyer-Pennington
found that 4-year-olds were also able to separate memories of scripted from deviant details when
the standard event was simplified and argued that this enabled the 4-year-olds to form a script
even though their cognitive resources were more limited than the older children. Thus, the
pattern of results was similar in these different age groups. There are many examples of younger
children remembering the details of repeated events as well as older children, in contrast to the
age differences found when children recall an event that they have experienced just one time
(Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Powell et al., 1999). Thus, both empirical evidence
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and contemporary theories of repeated-event memories suggest that age per se is not the crucial
variable in consistency effects, but rather the repetition of experiences that allows gist extraction.
Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999) were interested in children’s memories of details
that were actually experienced, whereas the current investigation focuses on children’s false
memories of details that were never experienced. Also, Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999)
studied memories of a single deviation occurrence, and so we still do not understand the
mechanisms involved in memories of a single instance of a repeated event that consists of details
that vary each time the event is experienced. This is a crucial difference because memory of a
single variation after prior experiences is quite good, whereas children are highly confused when
recalling a specific instance of a detail that is different each time children experience the event
(e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999). Powell and colleagues, for example,
observed a success rate of just 25% when children were asked to describe a specific instance of a
variable detail, and this error rate did not differ between 3- to 5-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds
(see Table 4, Powell et al., 1999). Hence, it is not yet clear how the consistency of suggestions
contributes to the production of false memories of a single instance of a repeated, variable event.
The results of one other study are also relevant to the current investigation. Ornstein and
his colleagues highlighted the role of prior knowledge of medical examinations in 4- and 6-yearolds’ ability to resist suggestions about actions that never occurred during a specific examination
(Ornstein, Merritt, Baker-Ward, Furtado, Gordon, & Principe, 1998). When asked about features
that were not present during the examination, Ornstein et al. found that the children were better
able to correctly deny the atypical suggestions (e.g., measure head circumference) than the
typical suggestions (e.g., check weight). The Ornstein et al. (1998) study addressed the role that
prior knowledge, rather than prior experience, played in children’s false-memory creation of
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consistent and inconsistent suggestions. Thus, the children’s knowledge of medical examinations
was not experimentally created and children may have acquired their knowledge through books,
television, classroom learning, and so on, in addition to their own experiences.
In the current study, then, we directly investigated whether the consistency of
suggestions to details that were repeated across a series of occurrences affected children’s
resistance to those suggestions. Although we expected that all children would be more resistant
to script-inconsistent suggestions than to script-consistent suggestions, we expected that children
with prior experience would show a magnified effect compared to those with no prior
experience. Specifically, we expected that children with prior experience would be more resistant
to script-inconsistent suggestions than children with a single experience. Repetition should create
stronger gist representations making inconsistent items stand out (c.f., the von Restorff effect,
Koffka, 1935) and thus increasing resistance to them.
As a supplementary investigation, we tested the parameters of the expected effect by
testing children’s memories after a week or after a month, expecting that the effects would be
greater after a month. Several studies with adults have documented higher levels of false alarms
for script-consistent features when memory is tested after a delay rather than immediately after
(Greenberg et al., 1998; Lampinen et al., 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2002). These findings make
sense according to schema-plus-correction models that conceptualize tags linking atypical details
to the memory representation. Over time, the tags are forgotten but the script is stable. Hence,
after a delay, typical features seem more familiar or plausible than atypical features. According
to fuzzy-trace theory, verbatim memories disintegrate faster than gist memories and so fuzzytrace theory also predicts that the consistency effect would be greater after a delay (see Brainerd
& Poole, 1997).
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Source monitoring and suggestibility
The second main aim of the investigation was to assess whether source-monitoring skills
contributed to children’s suggestibility after repeated experiences. To see whether children
genuinely believed that the false details had taken place during the target occurrence, a sourcemonitoring test was administered that required children to attribute the source of details to the
target occurrence or the interviewer who had provided the false suggestions. We expected that
resistance to suggestions and source monitoring would be positively correlated, and that children
in the repeated-experience condition would inaccurately attribute more of the false-consistent
than false-inconsistent suggestions to the target occurrence. One of the mechanisms of fuzzytrace theory is “phantom recollection” (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001), a process
describing how details can be confabulated leading to false-but-gist-consistent false memories
that actually contain verbatim details. Such confabulation is most likely when a) the gist trace is
especially strong, and b) the false suggestion is a particularly good match for the gist trace. Such
conditions are fulfilled when repeated experiences of an event have strengthened the gist trace
and highly gist-consistent suggestions are offered. Hence, children with repeated experience may
retrieve verbatim details and mistakenly assume that they actually observed those details.
The presence of a relationship between children’s source monitoring and suggestibility
for script-consistent and script-inconsistent items would be promising for forensic interviewing
techniques. In some studies, orienting children to source helped them ‘retract’ their false reports
(e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Poole & Lindsay, 2001). Poole and Lindsay (2001), for example,
induced false reports of never-experienced science demonstrations and found that, when children
were asked to discriminate whether the fictitious demonstration occurred for real or in a story,
the 8-year-olds retracted 67% of their false reports. Thus, we also investigated whether a source-
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monitoring test would help children retract their false reports. We expected that retraction rates
would be higher for script-inconsistent false memories than script-consistent false memories
because more episodic information about source would be encoded for the former items. This
latter prediction stems from schema theories of memory supporting a ‘cognitive economy’
mechanism (e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Schank, 1999). Specifically, consistent details need
not be stored episodically because memories can be reconstructed from the schema, whereas
inconsistent details that are not part of a schema need to be episodically encoded. Further,
although schemata allowed the efficient encoding of gist in a study with adults, perceptual
encoding was inhibited when script-consistent items were presented (Von Hippel, Jonides,
Hilton, & Narayan, 1993). Such perceptual information may include contextual details that can
later be retrieved and used to specify source. Thus, we expected that episodic information
pertaining to script-inconsistent items may be better encoded, stored, and thus made available for
source attribution than episodic information about consistent items.
Method
Design
Children aged 6 and 7 years participated in four occurrences of a scripted event and were
given a biasing interview during which the interviewer gave false descriptions that were
consistent or inconsistent with the theme of the details that had been set up over the four
occurrences. Memory for the last occurrence (the “target”) was tested at a memory interview
either a week or a month after the target occurrence and the interviewer probed both the true and
false descriptions of the target details. In addition, data were gathered from a control group of
children who experienced the event just one time. Hence, the study comprised a 2 (Experience:
single, repeat) x 2 (Delay: 1-week, 4-week) between-subjects experimental design. Two-thirds of

Why does repeated experience

11

the participants were also given a source-monitoring interview immediately after the memory
interview.
Participants
One-hundred and thirty children (64 girls) aged between 6 years, 0 months to 7 years, 8
months (M = 6 years, 8 months; SD = 4.11 months) participated in the study. The children were
recruited from schools in the [city] area and their parents gave informed consent. Children
participated in the event in groups of 20-28 and the groups were randomly assigned to
experience and delay condition with the constraint that the cells were approximately equal in the
mean age in months and gender distribution.
Materials and procedure
The events.
The activity was carried out either once or on four different days over a two-week period
in the children’s schools and was administered by a trained research assistant (RA) to groups of
20-28 children (though only children whose parents gave informed consent participated in the
interviews). Teachers were instructed not to talk with the children about the activities or to
inform them that they would later be interviewed. No person other than the children's teacher, the
RA, and the children were present in the room during the activities.
The to-be-remembered event was a scripted 30-minute activity that was modeled on that
used by Powell and Thomson (1996) in their study showing scripted memories in young
children. The event was labelled for the children as the “Deakin Activities” (see Table 1). The
activity comprised 16 target items embedded in several activities: physical exercise, listening to a
story, doing a puzzle, getting a surprise, and relaxing. Each of the 16 target items differed across
the four occurrences and was related to a theme (e.g., children always sat on something at floor

Why does repeated experience

12

level – cardboard, rubber mat, white sheet, newspaper; Item #1, Table 1). (For clarity, we will
use item #1 as an example throughout the Method section.) Four item sets were created that each
contained instantiations from four different groups (e.g., one group experienced items from the
columns labelled C, D, B, and E) and the items were presented in different orders in each set.
The target occurrence was tagged for children in the repeated-experience condition by
introducing a change in the fourth and final occurrence. Either a new research assistant (RA) led
the events, one who was different to the RA who administered the previous three occurrences (at
least 10 characteristics distinguished the two RAs, e.g., different hair color), or an object that was
always present in the activities was changed (a badge or a necklace). The way the target event
was tagged was counterbalanced across the different Experience x Delay cells but note that this
was not an experimental manipulation and the results did not differ based on which tag was used.
The RA and objects were also used in the event in the single-experience conditions, but
obviously their presence did not tag a change.
The biasing interview.
Either one or four weeks after the only or last occurrence, an unfamiliar RA carried out
the biasing interview. The interviewer explained that she was not present during the target event
and needed to find out what happened that day. The children were asked to focus on either “the
day you wore the badge/necklace” or “the day that [RA/RA2’s name] did the Deakin activities”,
as appropriate. First, a free narrative account was elicited with prompts such as “What
happened next” and “What else can you tell me about the Deakin Activities the day
you…?” The free narrative provided a check that all children could remember the activities. The
RA then explained that she had to ask some more questions and that the child should answer
them as best s/he can, even if the detail had been described earlier.
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The 16 questions that followed were in the form of “presuppositional questions”
(Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 1999) that are known to effectively elicit suggestibility effects. In
8 of the 16 questions, an item from the target event was inaccurately described but was still
plausible. Of these eight false suggestions, four were consistent with the theme of the item (falseconsistent details, e.g., if the child sat on a garbage bag, the interviewer would ask “I heard that
the leader brought you something to sit on the day you wore the badge to the Deakin Activities.
What color was the newspaper you sat on that day?”, i.e., something that was at floor level), and
the rest were inconsistent with the theme (false-inconsistent details; e.g., “What color was the
wooden chair you sat on that day?”; i.e., an item that was not at floor level). The remaining eight
questions probed accurate descriptions of items from the target event (true details, e.g., “What
colour was the garbage bag you sat on that day?”). The assignment of items to true, falseconsistent, and false-inconsistent status was counterbalanced across the four item sets.
The 16 questions were asked in random order, and then the RA explained that she had to
go through to check that she had all of the child’s answers. The interviewer replayed back to the
child each of the 16 questions and the child’s corresponding answers, thus securing commitment
to the false suggestions.
The memory interview.
The following day, the same interviewer conducted the memory interview to see what the
children remembered about the target event. After a brief period of rapport building, the
interviewer explained that she had lost the child’s answers and so had to ask about the activity
again. She tagged the target event for the children (i.e., using the object or person change), and
asked two pre-test questions, one for which the correct answer was ‘yes’ and one for which the
correct answer was ‘no’. All children correctly answered ‘no’ to the second question thus
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ensuring that children understood that they could say ‘no’ to a question. The RA then tested
memory with one of two sets of yes/no questions (see below), administered in random order.
Following this, she explained that she wanted to be sure she had understood things properly and
so she needed to ask about some other things that might have happened. The second set of 16
yes/no questions was then administered.
Two sets of 16 yes/no questions were needed in the memory interview because each of
the 16 target items had two corresponding questions – one probing the detail that was actually
presented in the target event (true detail; e.g., asking “Did you sit on a garbage bag?” when the
child actually did) and one probing a false suggestion (either false-consistent [e.g., asking “Did
you sit on newspaper?”] or false-inconsistent [e.g., asking “Did you sit on a wooden chair?”).
Children were asked questions about all of the details that were described in the biasing
interview (recall that eight were true, four were false-consistent, and four were false-inconsistent
details). The alternate version of each detail was also probed at the memory interview: for items
described as false-consistent or false-inconsistent at the biasing interview, the true version was
probed; for items accurately described at the biasing interview, false-consistent suggestions were
presented for half of them and false-inconsistent suggestions for the remainder.
The order in which the true and false instantiations of each item were probed was
counterbalanced, and the 16 questions in each set were administered in random order to each
child. Thus, there was a maximum possible score of 16 correct ‘yes’ responses for the true-detail
questions (eight questions contained the true details at both the biasing and memory interview,
eight questions contained the true detail at the memory interview only); a maximum score of
eight correct ‘no’ responses for questions about false-consistent details (four questions contained
false-consistent details at the biasing interview and memory interview; four contained the false
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description at the memory interview only); and a maximum score of eight correct ‘no’ responses
for questions about false-inconsistent details (four questions contained false-inconsistent details
at the biasing interview and memory interview; the remainder contained the false description at
the memory interview only). One researcher coded all transcripts and a second researcher who
was not otherwise involved in the study coded 20%. Interrater reliability, calculated as
agreements/ (agreements + disagreements), was 98%. Discrepancies were resolved and the codes
assigned by the principal coder were used in all analyses.
The source-monitoring interview.
The source-monitoring interview was carried out by the same interviewer immediately
after the memory interview, and given to all children in the single-experience conditions and, due
to resource constraints, half of the children in the repeated-experience condition.1 The
interviewer explained that she was still a little confused and needed to find out whether the child
actually saw certain details. The interviewer questioned the children about four false-consistent
and four false-inconsistent details (these items had been falsely described at the biasing
interview). The interviewer gave a false description (e.g., the newspaper, when the child
actually sat on a garbage bag) and asked “Did you see the newspaper that day or did I only tell
you about the newspaper?” (‘see’ and ‘tell’ options were alternated). The true descriptions of
each of the items were also probed (e.g., “Did you sit on the garbage bag? Did you see the
garbage bag or did I only tell you about the garbage bag?”) resulting in a 16-item test. The order
in which the true and false details were presented was counterbalanced. The child was then
thanked and escorted back to the regular classroom.
Responses were coded as accurate if children identified the target event as the source of
true items and the interviewer as the source of false-consistent and false-inconsistent items. Inter-
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rater percent agreement was at least 98% across all response types.
Results
There are three sections to the results. In the first section, children’s responses to the
memory interview are presented broken down by how the items were described at the biasing
interview). In the second section, the source-monitoring interview responses are presented.
Finally, we present analyses showing children’s retraction of false reports.
Responses at the memory interview
Items that were inaccurately described at the biasing interview.
A 2 (experience: single, repeated) x 2 (delay: 1-week, 1-month) x 2 (biasing interview
suggestion: false-consistent, false-inconsistent) x 2 (detail: true, false) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was run on the number of correct responses to the yes/no questions. Biasing interview
suggestion and detail were within-subjects variables. The false suggestions at the memory
interview were identical to the false suggestions at the biasing interview (e.g., a false-consistent
item in the biasing interview was also false-consistent at the memory interview), and so the
variable ‘detail’ contained just two levels (true, false). The means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 2.
There was a main effect of biasing interview suggestion because responses to questions
about items that were false-inconsistent at the biasing interview (M = 5.86, SD = 1.71) were
more accurate than those that were false-consistent (M = 5.54, SD = 1.73), F(1, 126) = 4.66, p <
.05. There were also main effects of delay, F(1, 122) = 9.95, p < .01, and detail, F(1, 122) =
35.57, p < .001. Overall, children interviewed after a week (M = 12.22, SD = 2.74) were more
accurate than those interviewed after a month (M = 10.61, SD = 3.09), and there were more
accurate answers given to questions about items that were accurately (M = 6.28, SD = 1.59) than
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inaccurately described at the memory interview (M = 5.12, SD = 2.14).
The main effect of experience approached significance, F(1, 122) = 2.87, p = .09, but
there was a significant 3-way interaction between experience, delay, and detail, F(1, 122) = 6.71,
p = .01. The interaction occurred because of the combined negative effects of prior experience
and a long delay. When questioned a week after the target event, children in both the singleexperience, t(34) = 2.25, p = .03, and the repeated-experience, t(28) = 3.34, p < .01, conditions
gave more accurate responses to questions about true details than false details (Single
experience: Ms = 6.54, 5.97 and SDs = 1.62, 1.54; Repeated-experience: Ms = 6.72, 5.14 and
SDs = 1.22, 2.33, for true and false details, respectively). At a month, however, although children
in the single-experience condition continued to show greater accuracy when answering questions
about true than false details (Ms = 6.43, 4.69 and SDs = 1.33, 1.91 for true and false details,
respectively), t(34) = 5.67, p < .001, children in the repeated-experience condition did not (Ms =
5.39, 4.65 and SDs = 1.84, 2.54 for true and false details, respectively), t(30) = 1.45, p = .16.
Items that were accurately described at the biasing interview.
As there were eight true items and four each of the false-consistent and false-inconsistent
suggestions, the mean for the true items was divided by two to enable comparison across items.
A 2 (experience: single, repeated) x 2 (delay: 1-week, 1-month) x 3 (detail: true, false-consistent,
false-inconsistent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run on the correct responses (see above)
and detail was within-subjects. There is no biasing interview variable because all items were
accurately described at the biasing interview, and there are now three levels of the variable
‘detail’ because each item from the biasing interview could be described in one of three ways at
the memory interview (true, false-consistent, false-inconsistent). The means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 3.
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There was a main effect of detail because there were fewer accurate responses to
questions containing false-consistent details (M = 3.42, SD = 0.80) than to questions containing
either false-inconsistent (M = 3.75, SD = 0.61) or true details (M = 3.78, SD = 0.49), F(2, 252) =
17.87, p < .001. The predicted Detail x Experience interaction was significant, F(2, 252) = 3.87,
p < .05. Children in the repeated-experience condition (M = 3.87, SD = 0.43) were more resistant
to questions probing false-inconsistent items than were children in the single-experience
condition (M = 3.66, SD = 0.72), t(128) = -1.97, p < .05. However, there were no effects of
experience on responses to questions about true or false-consistent details (see means in Table
3), ts(128) < 1.50, ps > .15.
In sum, responses at the memory interview showed that children were more resistant to
inconsistent suggestions than consistent suggestions regardless of whether the suggestions were
offered at the biasing interview (when the suggestions were presupposed as being true) or at the
memory interview (when yes/no questions were asked about the presence of the suggested
details). The consistency effect was more pronounced for children with repeated than a single
experience.
Responses at the source-monitoring interview
To see whether there was a consistency effect in children’s source monitoring and also to
see whether this was moderated by the amount of experience children had with the event, a 2
(experience: single, repeat) x 2 (delay: 1 week, 1 month) x 2 (biasing interview suggestion: falseconsistent, false-inconsistent) x 2 (detail: true, false) ANOVA was run on the number of correct
responses to the “see/tell” questions, with repeated-measures on the last two independent
variables. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4.
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There were main effects of biasing-interview suggestion, F(1, 95) = 10.49, p < .01, and
delay, F(1, 95) = 5.68, p < .02. As expected, there were more correct responses to questions
about false-inconsistent (M = 6.56, SD = 1.44) than false-consistent biasing interview items (M =
5.80, SD = 1.73), and more correct responses when the source-monitoring interview occurred a
week (M = 13.02, SD = 1.78) rather than a month (M = 11.73, SD = 3.11) after the target event.
There was an interaction between biasing-interview and detail, F(1, 95) = 4.60, p < .05,
that was qualified by an interaction between biasing interview, detail, and experience, F(1, 95) =
9.58, p < .01. Follow-up tests on the Biasing interview x Detail interaction revealed no
significant effects, although the pattern of means suggests that accurate source identification
depended on the consistency of the suggestion at the biasing interview. Specifically, when true
details were probed, accuracy was greatest when the false suggestion at the biasing interview
was inconsistent with the theme and lowest when the suggestion has been consistent with the
theme (Ms = 3.28, 2.85 and SDs = 0.83, 0.99, respectively). The mean for items that were
described as false-inconsistent at both the biasing and source-monitoring interviews was 3.27
(SD = 0.91); false-consistent at both interviews, M = 2.95 (SD = 0.97). Analyses exploring the
Biasing interview x Detail interaction separately for each experience condition confirmed that
this pattern was evident in the responses of children in the repeated condition, F(1, 28) = 8.60, p
< .01, but not the single condition, F(1, 69) < 1.00, ns (see Table 4 for the full set of means).
Next, to see whether there was an overall positive relationship between resistance to
suggestibility and source monitoring, correlations were computed between correct responses at
the memory interview and correct responses at the source-monitoring interview (N = 99). First,
the number of correct responses during the memory interview about false-consistent items (i.e.,
correct rejections) were correlated with the number of correct source-monitoring responses about
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false-consistent items and there was a significant positive relationship both before and after
controlling age in months, rs = .57, ps < .001. Second, the number of correct responses about
false-inconsistent items were correlated with the number of correct source-monitoring responses
to false-inconsistent items and again there was a strong and significant positive relationship both
before and after controlling age in months, rs = .69, ps < .001.
In sum, responses at the source-monitoring interview showed a positive relation between
monitoring the source of suggestions and resistance to those suggestions. Children were as able
to identify the source of false-inconsistent suggestions as true details that were actually in the
event, but had difficulty identifying the source of false-consistent suggestions. Children with
repeated experience were worse than children in the single-experience condition at identifying
that target details were present during the event.
Retraction Analyses
To see whether the source-monitoring interview was helpful in encouraging children to
retract their false reports, responses to items in the memory interview were compared with
children’s claims in the source-monitoring interview that they had actually seen the
corresponding items in the target event. Source identification of false alarms in the memory
interview was tracked first, followed by analyses on children’s accurate recognition (i.e., hits).
All proportional scores reported below were calculated separately for false-consistent and falseinconsistent items, and the means are presented in Table 5. In each analysis, the proportional
scores were entered into a 2 (experience: single, repeated) x 2 (biasing-interview suggestion:
false-consistent, false-inconsistent) ANOVA with repeated-measures on the latter variable.
Retraction of false alarms made in the memory interview.
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First, proportional scores were calculated to see whether the false alarms at the memory
interview reflected a genuine belief that children had actually seen those items in the target
event. The number of false alarms to the items at the memory interview (i.e., inaccurate
recognition of false suggestions) was the denominator, and the number of times that children
inaccurately claimed to have seen the corresponding items was the numerator. Hence, a large
proportion indicates poor source monitoring.2 There was a main effect of biasing-interview
suggestion because children were more likely to inaccurately claim that they had seen the falseconsistent (M = .60, SD = .46) than false-inconsistent suggestions (M = .35, SD = .42) in the
target event, F(1, 32) = 4.40, p < .05. Inversely, children were able to say that 40% of the falseconsistent suggestions and 65% of the false-inconsistent suggestions were provided by the
biasing interviewer despite falsely recognizing these items previously. See the first and third
columns of Table 5 to see the means separately for each experience condition.
Next, proportional scores were computed to see whether children could accurately
remember seeing items in the target event despite previously inaccurately recognizing false
descriptions of those items (i.e., these are responses to source-monitoring questions containing
true details). In contrast to the above proportional scores, the numerator was the number of times
children accurately claimed to have seen the corresponding true items in the target event. As can
be seen in the second and fourth columns in Table 5, the high scores show that children still
remembered seeing the actual items from the target event despite their previous false reports
about those items. There was a main effect of experience, F(1, 27) = 4.55, p < .05, because
children in the single-experience condition (M = .98, SD = .06) had more accurate sourcemonitoring scores than children in the repeated-experience condition (M = .81, SD = .35).
Source-monitoring accuracy did not differ as a function of the consistency of the suggestion.
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Thus, even though children falsely recognized misleading suggestions in the memory
interview, they retracted a substantial proportion of their false reports. Further, children
reinstated a large proportion of their memories of items that were in the target event when
explicitly asked whether they had seen these items in the target event.
Retraction of hits in the memory interview.
Although the above analyses show that children could retract some of their earlier false
reports, it is important to know whether children also retracted their accurate reports, that is,
were overly stringent in their false-memory editing. As above, proportional scores were
calculated; the denominators here, however, were the number of correct recognitions of true
items at the memory interview.
First, we examined children’s tendency to claim to have seen false-consistent and falseinconsistent details despite having previously accurately recognized the corresponding true
versions of these items at the memory interview. Thus, a high proportion reflects poor source
monitoring. There was a main effect of biasing interview because children inaccurately claimed
seeing more false-consistent (M = .40, SD = .42) than false-inconsistent items (M = .25, SD =
.39), F(1, 84) = 4.01, p < .05. Overall, children made source-monitoring errors for about a third
of the items despite accurately recognizing the target items earlier in the study. Inversely,
children were able to accurately identify that the biasing interviewer had provided 60% of the
false-consistent and 75% of the false-inconsistent suggestions. See columns 5 and 7 of Table 5
for means separated by condition.
Finally, we examined whether children accurately remembering seeing target items when
they had accurately recognized these items at the memory interview. There was a main effect of
experience, F(1,89) = 4.07, p < .05, that was qualified by a Biasing interview x Experience
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interaction, F(1, 89) = 6.67, p = .01. Children in the single-experience condition accurately
remembered seeing items from the target event (M = .91, SD = .22) more than children in the
repeated-experience condition did (M = .83, SD = .28), though the interaction showed that this
was true for responses to the false-consistent items only, t(92) = 3.43, p = .001. Experience did
not affect source monitoring for items that were designated as false-inconsistent at the biasing
interview, t(92) = -0.46, p > .50. See columns 6 and 8 of Table 5 for other means.
In sum, the retraction analyses showed that children were able to retract false reports
(i.e., say that they had not actually seen the false items despite previously falsely recognizing
them), but could do so for inconsistent items more than consistent items. Children made some
source-monitoring errors for items that they had previously accurately recognized, but they did
this more when confronted with false-consistent than false-inconsistent suggestions.
Nevertheless, true-report retraction occurred substantially less frequently than false-report
retraction but only when the biasing interview suggestions were inconsistent with the theme of
the detail (children retracted 40% of both their false and true reports with respect to falseconsistent items, but retracted 65% of their false reports and just 25% of their true reports with
respect to false-inconsistent items). Overall, children with repeated experience were more
confused about the source of true and false items than children who had experienced the event
just one time.
Discussion
Children and adults remember script-inconsistent information better than script-consistent
information (e.g., Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Farrar & Goodman, 1999; Neuschatz et al., 2002;
Pezdek et al., 1989). We investigated whether the consistency of suggestions to details in a
repeated event might affect children’s suggestibility when asked about a single instance of the
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event. The evidence shows that children were clearly more resistant to suggestions that were
script-inconsistent than those that were script-consistent. The effect was observed both when the
recognition test probed the suggestions from the biasing interview, and when the suggestions
were presented for the first time at test. Further, children continued to cling to their false reports
of consistent suggestions more than they clung to false reports of inconsistent suggestions. These
results extend previous research by showing how the consistency of false suggestions to a
repeated event can lead to both increases and decreases in children’s suggestibility when
questioned about a particular instance of a repeated event. In addition, these results show that
children’s source-monitoring skills varied depending on the consistency of suggested details.
Children were better able to identify the interviewer as the source of inconsistent suggestions,
and thus retract earlier false reports, than they were at identifying her as the source of consistent
suggestions; the children, especially those with prior event experience, seemed to genuinely
believe that many of the false-consistent suggestions actually occurred during the target event.
Why might children be more suggestible when confronted with script-consistent than
script-inconsistent suggestions? According to fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995),
false memories can occur when false-but-gist-consistent options are presented (Brainerd et al.,
2002). False memories are thus more likely when false suggestions are gist-consistent than when
they are gist-inconsistent. Acceptance of false-but-gist-consistent suggestions may occur because
these suggestions give rise to a feeling of familiarity which is mistaken for a memory of an
experienced detail. The script-confirmation-deployment model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) offers
an alternative explanation: More information-processing resources are directed toward encoding
script-inconsistent than script-consistent details. Although this process explains how memories
of presented script-inconsistent details are more accurate than script-consistent details, in the
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current study, the script-inconsistent suggestions may have attracted attention and, thus, the item
may have been clearly and episodically tagged in memory as an instance of a false suggestion.
This episodic encoding may later have prevented children from accepting the script-inconsistent
items because they could retrieve the episodic information associated with the first presentation
of the suggestion (i.e., by recalling the interviewer making the suggestion). The results of the
source-monitoring test support this explanation because the source of script-inconsistent items
was identified more often than the source of script-consistent items.
As anticipated on the basis of fuzzy-trace and script theories, the magnitude of the effects
depended on how much prior experience children had with the event. We expected that children
with repeated experience would show enhanced resistance to false-inconsistent suggestions when
compared to children with no prior experience and the results from the recognition test supported
this hypothesis. The finding that the consistency of the suggestion can moderate the effects of
experience is a novel finding that may explain why repetition increased suggestibility in some
studies (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell & Roberts, 2002, yes/no condition) but not in
others (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). When the consistency of the suggestion is ignored, children
with repeated experience in the current study falsely recognized more details than did children
with no prior experience. Hence, at first glance, the results appeared to have replicated studies
showing increases in suggestibility following repetition (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell &
Roberts, 2002). However, children with repeated experience were better than those with no prior
experience at rejecting false-inconsistent suggestions when these suggestions were presented for
the first time at test, though experience did not affect recognition after exposure to scriptconsistent suggestions. Thus, the effects of prior experience on suggestibility are moderated by
the consistency of the suggestions to the target details. Whether repetition increases
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suggestibility may be partly dependent on the thematic consistency of the individual variants
across a series of occurrences and the consistency of the suggestions to the theme. Further
research could focus on identifying the factors and conditions that affect suggestibility after
repeated experiences rather than pondering whether repetition simply increases suggestibility.
We had expected that the effect of consistency would be more pronounced after a delay,
but this was not supported. The lack of an interaction is unlikely to be the result of a Type I error
because other, predictable effects of retention interval were observed (i.e., recognition and source
monitoring were more accurate when children were interviewed a week than a month after the
target occurrence, replicating much previous work, e.g., Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell et al.,
1999). Rather, consistency probably did not interact with retention interval because the “short”
delay in the current study was actually longer than that used in previous studies reporting
increases in false recognition of script-consistent details over time (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1998;
Lampinen et al., 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2002; Ornstein et al., 1998). In these studies, recognition
was tested within 24 hours of the target event, whereas the children in the short delay condition
of the current study were tested after a week. Hence, any effects of highly-consistent suggestions
may already have occurred by the time we tested the children. The 1-week and 1-month delays in
the current study were chosen for ecological validity because most incidents of abuse reported by
child witnesses occur more than 24 hours before they are interviewed. It would be interesting,
however, to study the magnitude of the consistency effect at very short delays to enable
generalization to cases when immediate interviews are possible.
We expected that the effect of consistency in recognition would be closely tied to
children’s source monitoring of the experienced and suggested details. Indeed, there were strong
correlations between the recognition and source-monitoring scores for both script-consistent and

Why does repeated experience

27

script-inconsistent items. Specifically, correct acceptance of experienced details and correct
rejection of suggestions were associated with accurate identification of details as originating in
the target occurrence and biasing interview, respectively. Hence, false recognitions of suggested
details reflected beliefs that the details had been genuinely witnessed during the target
occurrence. The relation between source monitoring and suggestibility has been theorized for
some time (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), but the current findings contribute to the growing
body of literature providing direct empirical evidence of the relation (e.g., Giles, Gopnik, &
Heyman, 2002; Leichtman, Morse, Dixon, & Spiegel, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Thierry &
Spence, 2002). It would be interesting to investigate whether children’s beliefs that the suggested
details were experienced during the target occurrence were accompanied by recollective
experiences, as would be expected from “phantom recollection” (Brainerd et al., 2001;
Neuschatz et al., 2003). Replicating the current study using a recall rather than a recognition test
would indicate whether children were actually retrieving false episodic details, and also clarify
the generalizability of the results to a variety of question formats.
The source-monitoring results suggest that the familiarity mechanism in fuzzy-trace
theory (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) explains false memories of gist-consistent items well, but
not gist-inconsistent items. Gist-consistent items seem familiar to children and they misattribute
the familiar feeling to prior contact with the item in the target event; in the current study,
children’s explicit claims that they had seen gist-consistent items support this idea. Gistinconsistent items would also be familiar to children in the current study, however, because the
suggestions were repeated at the biasing, memory, and source-monitoring interviews, and yet
children were sometimes able to correctly attribute the familiarity to the interviews rather than
the target event (65% of these items were correctly attributed to the interviewers). Thus, children
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seemed to have encoded source-specifying information for gist-inconsistent items better than
source information for gist-consistent items. Thus, fuzzy-trace theory explains the initial
resistance to gist-inconsistent suggestions (as does script theory, e.g., Farrar & Goodman, 1992).
The current results, however, highlight that specific source-monitoring processes may need to be
incorporated into these theoretical models to explain resistance to gist-inconsistent items over
time. Perhaps the presentation of gist-inconsistent items was so salient that children were
motivated to encode source-specifying information at the time of presentation; false memories
invoked by feelings of familiarity could be resisted later on by retrieval of the source-specifying
information associated with gist-inconsistent suggestions.
Several lines of evidence in the current study suggest that the gist-consistent suggestions
actually interfered with children’s memories of the final occurrence in the series. Children with
prior experience were no better at recognizing details from the occurrence than they were at
resisting false suggestions, at least when tested after a month. When children were asked to
identify the source of details, children with prior experience were more accurate at attributing the
false-consistent suggestions to the interviewer than they were at attributing the experienced detail
to the target occurrence. Thus it is plausible that, following repeated experiences, the scriptconsistent suggestions retroactively interfered with children’s memories of the target details
preventing them from identifying the details that they had actually witnessed (Belli, Windschitl,
McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; Chandler, 1991). Although children acquiesced to the inconsistent
suggestions at the biasing interview, these suggestions had fewer long-lasting effects on their
reports than did the consistent suggestions. Support for this assertion also comes from the
retraction analyses which showed that children could retract false reports or reinstate true
memories for inconsistent items more than they could for consistent items.
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It would be interesting to further study the parameters of the consistency effect in
eyewitness memories across a variety of ages given differences in gist or script extraction
(Brainerd et al., 2002). Although there are few studies on children’s suggestibility after repeated
experiences, the effects that have been demonstrated do not seem to be dependent on age per se.
As the patterns of effects in older (e.g., aged 6-8) and younger (e.g., aged 3-5) children are
virtually identical (e.g., see Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell et al., 1999), differences may lie
in the magnitude of the effects (e.g. older children are usually more accurate than younger
children).3 Research in developmental differences may advance through investigation of the
factors likely to moderate event-repetition effects on suggestibility, factors that are associated
with age. Such factors may include the development of source-monitoring skills, resistance to
interference, the complexity of the event, and the amount of experience needed for children of
different ages to develop scripts. Further, it would be important to better understand how the
nature of the inconsistency may increase or decrease children’s resistance to suggestibility and
how this interacts with age and interview technique. Age differences are more typically found in
recall of repeated events, rather than recognition, and atypical actions that disrupt the event are
better recalled than atypical actions that are irrelevant to the goal of the event (e.g., Hudson,
1998).
In sum, the results of the present study show that 6- to 7-year-old children are more
resistant to script-inconsistent than script-consistent suggestions. This effect is magnified when
gist traces of events are likely strong, such as after repeated experiences. These results clarify
discrepancies in the literature regarding the effects of repetition on children’s suggestibility and
indicate that prior experience increases suggestibility to gist-consistent suggestions, but reduces
suggestibility to gist-inconsistent suggestions. Further, consistent suggestions may interfere with
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memories of the actual events reducing the possibility of reinstatement. From a practical
perspective, child witnesses alleging multiple abuse and who appear to draw on a script (e.g., by
talking in the present/future tense as in “he will lock the door” or “she leaves me in the
bedroom”) may be at increased risk of creating false memories after exposure to gist-consistent
suggestions. When presented with gist-inconsistent suggestions that are nevertheless plausible,
however, children may be able to resist the suggestions and even retract them if given the
opportunity to identify the source of the suggestion. The results suggest that it may be
worthwhile to develop the source-identification procedures for use by forensic interviewers.
Overall, these results suggest that forensic interviewers should be especially cautious about
suggesting details that may have occurred in other instances of abuse (i.e., that are consistent
with the gist or script of the abuse) when questioning about a specific instance.
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Footnotes
1

Specifically, children in the repeated-experience whose target event was tagged by a change in

an object (badge or necklace) were given the source-monitoring interview. To see whether the
way the target event was tagged affected source monitoring, a 2 (tag: object, person) independent
samples t-test was conducted on the source-monitoring scores and there was no effect, t(97) = 0.89, p = .37. In addition, the analyses of the memory-interview responses (i.e., using data from
all the children in the repeated-experience condition) were repeated using data from only those
children who also provided source-monitoring interview responses, and the findings were
identical. Because there was no evidence, then, that there was any difference in the children who
did and did not provide source-monitoring interview responses, analyses on the memory
interview comprise the full sample, and all source-monitoring interview data was included in the
source-monitoring interview analyses so as not to restrict sample size.
2

Proportional scores can only be calculated for children who made at least one error and so the

degrees of freedom differ in the following analyses. So as not to restrict sample sizes in the
analyses, all proportions were collapsed across the variable of delay after independent t-tests
showed that there were no differences in proportional scores provided at the 1-week and 1-month
delays.
3

The analyses reported in the current study were repeated controlling for age in months and the

effects remained statistically significant.
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Table 1
The pool of items in the event.

No.

Item

Instantiation
A

B

C

D

E

F

1.

Children’s seat

cardboard

rubber mat

garbage bag

white sheet

newspaper

pillow

2.

Cloak of leader

red

yellow

white

blue

green

black

3.

Koala’s name

Boo

Kip

Pop

Stan

Jo

Lee

4.

Noisy animal

kangaroo

goanna

kookaburra

dingo

wombat

possum

5.

Warm-up activity

run

wiggle fingers

touch toes

jump

dance

sit-ups

6.

Source of story

garbage bin at

leader wrote on

Posted by

Library at

present under tree

[university]

[university]

[university]

[university]

[university]

from [university]

bookshop

instruction

person

horse

lucky rabbit

fly

Supercat

elephant

worm

Child A

Child B

Child C

Child D

Child E

Child F

7.

Content of story

8.

Child who holds up
pictures

friend
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9.

Utensil to note who

pencil

crayon

chalk

marker

lipstick

paint

waving a

playing guitar

balancing

juggling

walking on tightrope

bicycling

child is
10.

Puzzle

wand
11.

Music/scene for

balls

beach

kites

birds

rain

park

circus

legs

nose

stomach

arms

ears

chin

baby wipe

lip gloss

hand cream

face spray

cool drink

ice pack

rocket

rainbow

star

flag

sun

aeroplane

box

purse

envelope

jar

basket

metal tin

to movie

walking a dog

visiting friend

birthday

going on holiday

shop for some

in hospital

party

resting
12.

Part of body is
relaxed

13.

Method of getting
refreshed

14.

Theme of sticker

15.

Container with
stickers

16.

Next stop

new clothes
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Table 2
The Memory Interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items that were falsely
described at the Biasing Interview.

Description in

False-Consistent items

False-Inconsistent items

biasing interview
Description in

True

False Consistent

True

False Inconsistent

1 week (N = 35)

3.26 (0.89)

2.83 (0.92)

3.29 (0.93)

3.14 (0.88)

4 week (N = 35)

3.03 (0.89)

2.23 (1.17)

3.40 (0.85)

2.46 (1.04)

Total (N = 70)

3.14 (0.89)

2.53 (1.09)

3.34 (0.88)

2.80 (1.02)

1 week (N = 29)

3.21 (0.90)

2.55 (1.18)

3.52 (0.74)

2.59 (1.40)

4 week (N = 31)

2.68 (1.11)

2.35 (1.25)

2.71 (1.04)

2.29 (1.51)

Total (N = 60)

2.93 (1.04)

2.45 (1.21)

3.10 (0.97)

2.43 (1.46)

memory interview
Condition
Single-Experience

Repeat-Experience

Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses; All scores out of 4.
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Table 3
The Memory Interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items that were accurately
described at the Biasing Interview.

Truea

False Consistent

False Inconsistent

1 week (N = 35)

3.86 (0.68)

3.46 (0.85)

3.69 (0.80)

4 week (N = 35)

3.83 (0.36)

3.37 (0.73)

3.63 (0.65)

Total (N = 70)

3.84 (0.54)

3.41 (0.79)

3.66 (0.72)

1 week (N = 29)

3.76 (0.57)

3.59 (0.73)

3.93 (0.26)

4 week (N = 31)

3.68 (0.39)

3.26 (0.86)

3.81 (0.54)

Total (N = 60)

3.72 (0.49)

3.42 (0.81)

3.87 (0.43)

Description in
memory interview
Condition
Single

Repeat

Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses; aThere were eight true items and so the scores were
divided by 2 to enable comparison across item scores; All other scores were out of 4.
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Table 4
The Source-Monitoring Interview: Mean accurate responses to questions about items that were
falsely described at the Biasing Interview.

Description in

False Consistent items

False Inconsistent items

biasing interview
Description in

True

source-monitoring

False

True

False Inconsistent

Consistent

interview
Condition
Single
1 week (N = 35)

3.11 (1.00)

3.00 (0.77)

3.46 (0.66)

3.51 (0.70)

4 week (N = 35)

2.74 (1.12)

2.63 (1.22)

3.20 (0.90)

3.14 (0.77)

Total (N = 70)

2.93 (1.00)

2.81 (1.03)

3.33 (0.79)

3.33 (0.76)

1 week (N = 13)

2.92 (0.95)

3.23 (0.60)

3.38 (0.65)

3.31 (1.030

4 week (N = 16)

2.44 (0.96)

3.31 (0.87)

3.00 (1.10)

3.00 (1.37)

Total (N = 29)

2.66 (0.97)

3.28 (0.75)

3.17 (0.93)

3.14 (1.22)

Repeat

Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses; All scores out of 4.
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Table 5
The Source-Monitoring Interview: The proportion of items that children claimed they had actually seen in the target event as a
function of suggestibility in the Memory Interview.

Memory Interview

False alarms

Hits

response

(i.e., false suggestions were inaccurately recognized)

(i.e., true descriptions were accurately recognized)

Biasing-interview

False-consistent

False-inconsistent

False-consistent

False-inconsistent

description
Source-monitoring

False-

True

False-

True

Interview description

consistent

Single-experience

.66 (.45)

.97 (.13)

.41 (.45)

1.00 (.00)

.40 (.39)

.94 (.16)

.22 (.35)

.88 (.28)

Repeated-experience

.50 (.48)

.85 (.32)

.25 (.34)

.77 (.39)

.39 (.48)

.75 (.36)

.32 (.46)

.92 (.19)

inconsistent

Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

False-

True

consistent

False-

True

inconsistent

